On Delegation under Relational Contracts

Oliver Gürtler ()

No 113, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: In this paper, a principal’s decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task herself enables a much wider use of relational contracts.

Keywords: Job design; relational contracts; formal contracts; delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 L23 M52 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-mic and nep-soc
Date: 2006-05
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/113.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:113

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Claudia Jung ().