On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

Jo Seldeslachts (), Tomaso Duso () and Enrico Pennings ()

No 240, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

Keywords: Research Joint Ventures; Product Market Collusion; Empirical Test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 L44 L52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-tid
Date: 2008-03
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Working Paper: On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion (2008)
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