Centralized and decentralized of provision of public goods

Janos Feidler and Klaas Staal ()
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Klaas Staal: University of Bonn

No 236, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legis lature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are influenced by spill over effects and differences in jurisdictional size. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.

Keywords: Decentralization; Local public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 H70 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
Date: 2008-05
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:241

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