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Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy Indexes

Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso (), Giancarlo Spagnolo and Christiana Vitale ()
Additional contact information
Paolo Buccirossi: LEAR
Lorenzo Ciari: LEAR and EUI
Christiana Vitale: Lear

No 284, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Indicator; Deterrence; Competition Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 K21 O4 C23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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