A Proxy Bidding Mechanism that Elicits all Bids in an English Clock Auction Experiment

Dirk Engelmann () and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

No 36, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: This paper reconsiders experimental tests of the English clock auction. We point out why the standard procedure can only use a small subset of all bids, which gives rise to a selection bias. We propose an alternative yet equivalent format that makes all bids visible, and apply it to a “wallet auction” experiment. Finally, we test the theory against various alternative hypotheses, and compare the results with those that would have been obtained if one had used the standard procedure. Our results confirm that the standard tests are subject to a significant selection bias.

Keywords: English Clock Auctions; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: Written
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