Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? - On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts

Matthias Kräkel () and Dirk Sliwka

No 99, Discussion Papers from SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the principal's profits from entering the market are sufficiently large relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can impose a fine on the agent for leaving the firm, she will never prefer a non-compete agreement.

Keywords: fine; incentives; incomplete contracts; non-compete agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 J3 K1 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-law and nep-mic
Date: 2006-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? -- On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts (2006)
Working Paper: Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:99

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