Representing others' preferences in mixed motive games: was Schelling right

Giovanna Devetag and Massimo Warglien ()

No 208, CEEL Working Papers from Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Representing Others' Preferences in Mixed Motive Games: Was Schelling Right (2001)
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