Cooperative Norms and Defection in Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Analytic Narratives on Evolution of Strategic Non-cooperative Behaviour in the Network

Kaire Põder ()
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Kaire Põder: Estonian Business School

No 162, Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology

Abstract: The evolutionary game theory and network segregation models are used for explaining strategic changes in micro behaviour. Simulations are used for modelling strategic responses based on interviews. Prisoners’ dilemma situation is used in infinitely iterated games, where randomness is created through exogenous shock of opening the network to “aliens”. Also the number of connections is modified and different discount factors are used. Consequently it is found that large and small networks differ by behavioural strategies: in large networks individuals are more self-regarding and reciprocal only to benevolent behaviour; in small networks people rely on cooperative social norms.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; strategic behaviour; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 B52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

Published in Working Papers in Economics.School of Economics and Business Administration,Tallinn University of Technology (TUTWPE), Pages 53-67

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