Solving a three player differential game in resource economics - the case of exhaustible resources

Petra Huck ()
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Petra Huck: Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group, Technical University of Munich

No 42005, Discussion Papers from Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group

Abstract: Differential games link strategic interactions between agents and optimization concerning time. Past and current actions of each player influence all future strategy sets and pay offs through a transition law. Due to high complexity, it is hard to find a Nash-equilibrium within a differential game and it is even harder to get some results in comparative statics. It is the purpose of the paper to describe an approximation routine for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a simple differential game in exhaustible resources. Excel is applied as it is a wild spread tool.

JEL-codes: A22 C73 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-env and nep-gth
Date: 2005-04
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