“BRANDED GENERICS” AS A STRATEGY TO LIMIT CANNIBALIZATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS

Michael R. Ward () and David Reiffen
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David Reiffen: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Working Papers from University of Texas at Arlington, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously-patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm’s profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments.

Keywords: Pharmaceuticals; Generic Drugs; Oligopoly; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L65 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2005-05

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http://www.uta.edu/faculty/mikeward/brandedgenerics.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: 'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets (2007)
Journal Article: 'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets (2007)
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