Taxes en Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs

Paul Beaudry () and Charles Blackorby ()

UBC Departmental Archives from UBC Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and non-market activities, (2) can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, (3) are utilitarian.

Keywords: TAXES; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Related works:
Working Paper: Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs (2006)
Working Paper: Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs (1998)
Working Paper: TAXES AND EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES IN OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS (2004)
Journal Article: Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:bricol:97-21

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