Product Market Competition, Managerial Inventives, and Firm Valuation

Stefan Beiner, Markus Schmid and Gabrielle Wanzenried

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: Our paper is a further contribution to the still very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we investigate the relationships between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation in a multivariate OLS framework. To take into account a possible endogeneity of the incentives provided to managers and Tobin's Q, our measure of firm value, we additionally employ a simultaneous equations framework. The sample comprises 156 Swiss firms for the year 2002, and the compensation data refer to the firms' top management and the board of directors in total. Our results suggest that more intensive product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers and a lower firm value

Keywords: Product Market Competition; Managerial Incentives; Firm Valuation; Simultaneous Equations System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 J33 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-bec and nep-com
Date: 2004-07
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0412

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