Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Ola Andersson, Matteo Maria Galizzi (), Tim Hoppe, Sebastian Kranz (), Karen van der Wiel and Erik Wengström ()

Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubs:wpaper:0811

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