On Revelation of Private Information in Stock Market Economies

Marcus Berliant and Sankar De.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marcus Berliant ()

No RPF-245, Research Program in Finance Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: The notion that an agent in a given market can infer from the market price the (non-price) information received by other agents, as embodied in the existing studies of revealing rational expectations equilibrium, requires that the agent know the correct functional relationship between the non-price information of all agents and the resulting equilibrium price. This condition is usually restrictive and unsuitable as a description of reality. In this paper we show that this condition is also unnecessary in a stock market economy where producers or firms use their private information in their own optimization programs,k which include stock purchases. Interestingly, this result does not extend to the case of consumers with private information.

Date: 1995-04-01

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucb:calbrf:rpf-245

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA 94720-1922

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Program in Finance Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley
Address: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().