Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms

Aaron S. Edlin and Mario Epelbaum.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Aaron Edlin ()

No 93-222, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: We ask when firms with increasing returns can cover their costs independently by charging two- part tariffs (TPTs), a condition we call independent viability. To answer, we develop notions of substitutability and complementarity that account for the total value of goods and use them to find the maximum extractable surplus. We then show that independent viability is a sufficient condition for existence of a general equilibrium in which regulated natural monopolies use TPTs. Independent viability also guarantees efficiency when the increasing returns arise solely from fixed costs. For arbitrary technologies, it ensures that a Second Welfare Theorem holds.

Date: 1993-12-01

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms (1993)
Journal Article: Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms (1995)
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