Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies

Bryan Ellickson and Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer, and William R.Zame.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: William R. Zame

No 97-255, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: This paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation. Agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market, can belong to several clubs, and care about the characteristics of the other members of thei r clubs. The space of agents and the number of possible club types are finite. It is shown that (i) approximate competitive equilibrium exists, (ii) the core can approximately be decentralized. The approximations are close if the economy is large. The central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population.

Date: 1997-04-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies (1999)
Working Paper: Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies (1997)
Journal Article: Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies (2001)
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