A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership

Habib Ahmed () and Stephen M. Miller ()

No 1999-01, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Keywords: unions; bargaining; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/1999-01.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:1999-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Address: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().