The Economics of Land Title Reform

Thomas Miceli () and Joseph Kieyah

No 2003-02, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a model of land title reform which shows that a policy of voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is the existence of an externality that prevents individual landowners from fully internalizing the benefits of the new system. Some evidence for the theory is presented based on historic efforts to institute land registration in the United States and England. Implications are also drawn for ongoing attempts by developing countries to establish formal property rights systems for land as part of a policy to spur economic growth.

JEL-codes: K11 O17 Q15 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev, nep-law, nep-res and nep-ure
Date: 2002-10, Revised 2003-01
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2003-02.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The economics of land title reform (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2003-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Address: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().