Credible Criminal Enforcement

Matthew Baker () and Thomas Miceli ()

No 2003-40, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the government can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has chosen. We study the government's problem when credibility is an issue. We find that several of the standard predictions of the economic model of crime and punishment are robust to commitment, but that credibility may in some cases result in lower apprehension rates, and hence a higher crime rate, compared to the static version of the model.

Keywords: Economics of Crime; Credible Commitment; Time Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2003-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Credible Criminal Enforcement (2005)
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