A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders

Thomas Miceli () and Catherine Bucci

No 2004-39, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employments opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.

Keywords: Criminal enforcement; repeat offenders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2004-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-39

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