Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

Thomas Miceli ()

No 2006-24, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.

Keywords: Entrapment; criminal solicitation; law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2006-09
Note: I acknowledge the helpful comments of Bruce Hay and two referees.
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Related works:
Working Paper: Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2006-24

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