The Economics of Criminal Procedure

Thomas Miceli ()

No 2007-24, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Criminal procedure concerns the rules regarding the treatment of criminal defendants during the time from their arrest until the determination of a final verdict. From an economic perspective, the goal of this process is to achieve the most accurate determination of guilt at the lowest possible cost. The process encompasses plea bargaining, the bail system, rules regarding the determination of guilt at trial, and appeal. Criminal procedure also affects deterrence because it ultimately determines the expected punishment imposed on offenders. However, uncertainty in enforcement necessarily leads to a conflict between the goals of deterrence and error avoidance.

Keywords: Criminal procedure; plea bargaining; rules of evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2007-06
Note: I acknowledge the insightful comments of Richard Adelstein.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-24

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