A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral

Thomas Miceli ()

No 2008-13, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too many or too few suits. Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits. In particular, because allowing suits tends to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution, the social value of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the productivity of victim care in lowering accident risk.

Keywords: Accidents; deterrence; lawsuits; litigation costs; social versus private value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2008-04
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-13

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