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A Question of Title: Property Rights and Asset Values

Thomas Miceli (), Henry J. Munneke, C. F. Sirmans and Geoffrey K. Turnbull
Additional contact information
Henry J. Munneke: University of Georgia
C. F. Sirmans: Florida State University
Geoffrey K. Turnbull: Georgia State University

No 2008-32, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of land title systems on property values. The predominant system in the U.S., the recording system, awards title to claimants over current possessors, whereas the Torrens registration system awards title to the current owner. In theory, the registration system maximizes property value, all else equal, but in practice, the systems differ depending on the risk of a claim and administrative costs. A natural experiment in Cook County, Illinois, where both systems have existed since 1897, allows a test of the theory. The results, based on commercial and industrial properties, reveal that parcels tend to self-select into the two systems based on the predictions of the theory.

Keywords: Land title system; property rights; recording system; Torrens system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 P14 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
Date: 2008-08
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