“Keystone Cops” Meet “Pirates of the Somali Coast”: The Failure of International Efforts to Control Maritime Piracy

Paul Hallwood () and Thomas Miceli ()

No 2011-09, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Modern-day piracy on the high seas once again poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between pirates (offenders) and shippers (victims), a factor not previously studied in the law enforcement literature. A key implication of the model is that greater enforcement efforts will not necessarily result in less activity by pirates. Optimal enforcement policies are complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problems therefore impede the effectiveness of current international laws against piracy.

Keywords: International law; law enforcement; piracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2011-05
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-09

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