The Law and Economics of International Cooperation Against Maritime Piracy

Paul Hallwood () and Thomas Miceli ()

No 2011-12, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea requires signatories to “cooperate” against maritime piracy, but “cooperate” is undefined. Enforcement is a public good – creating uncompensated benefits for others, so suffering from free-rider problems. Our analysis readily explains why more pirates captured are released than prosecuted; why the U.N. and International Maritime Organization are seeking to reduce enforcement costs; why some in the shipping industry want to apply the 1988 Convention against terrorism at sea; and why still others want to move prosecution of pirates out of national courts to an international court.

Keywords: International law; law enforcement; maritime piracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2011-06
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-12

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