On the Determination of Roles in Bargaining Models: Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

Andrew F Daughety () and Jennifer Reinganum ()

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Keywords: bargaining; economic models; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uia:iowaec:92-26

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics
Address: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Renea Jay ().