Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information

S. Rao Aiyagari and Stephen Williamson ()

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a random matching model without monetary exchange where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations even while goods are not.

Keywords: INFORMATION; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information (1997)
Journal Article: Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-03

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