On the Emergence of Social Norms

Edward John Cartwright ()

Studies in Economics from Department of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.

Keywords: Social norms; conformity; best reply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2007-01

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