Social Norms and Naive Beliefs

Amrish Patel () and Edward John Cartwright ()

Studies in Economics from Department of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the effect that naive agents (those who take behaviour at "face value") have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naive inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naive agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.

Keywords: Signalling; Conformity; Social Norms; Naive beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-soc
Date: 2009-03

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