A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability

Jose Apesteguia () and Miguel A. Ballester

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Keywords: Individual rationality; Rationalizability; Consistency; Bounded rationality; Behavioral economics; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2008-05
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1089

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