Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

Nir Dagan ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterization results; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number of potential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires core selection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is valid also when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences.

Date: 1996-01
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Working Paper: Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence (1996)
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