Does Reasoning Enhance Learning?

Nicolaas J. Vriend ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; game theory; reasoning; reinforcement learning; Leex (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 1996-10
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:185

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