Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games

Nir Dagan () and Roberto Serrano ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Keywords: Coalitional games; social choice; Nash program; implementation; scale invariance; ordinal invariance; randomness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games (1998)
Journal Article: Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:217

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