Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment

Ramon Marimon and Vincenzo Quadrini

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.

Keywords: Innovation; Knowledge Capital; Enforcement; Growth; Competition; Commitment; Recursive Contracts; Mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O30 O31 O40 J24 E22 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-dge, nep-ent and nep-mac
Date: 2005-12
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/933.pdf Whole Paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2006)
Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:933

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Series data maintained by ().