Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union

Hein Roelfsema ()

No 04-16, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of legislative bargaining in the EU on public goods provision and lobbying. We argue that delegation to a single policy maker at the centralized level -which we call supranational policy making- increases lobbying expenditures. When policy in the center is formulated by a committee consisting of national representatives -intergovernmental decision making- centralization causes lobbying expenditures fall, for centralization makes national policy makers more responsive to demands from domestic lobbies. In the extensions we consider the effects of enlargement on lobbying and analyze endogenous lobby formation.

Keywords: Centralization; Fiscal Federalism; Legislative Bargaining; Lobbying; the European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 F36 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-pbe and nep-reg
Date: 2004-07
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