Review of economic theories of regulation
J.A. den Hertog
No 10-18, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics
This paper reviews the economic theories of regulation. It discusses the public and private interest theories of regulation, as the criticisms that have been leveled at them. The extent to which these theories are also able to account for privatization and deregulation is evaluated and policies involving re-regulation are discussed. The paper thus reviews rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation, interconnection and access regulation, and franchising or bidding processes. The primary aim of those instruments is to improve the operating efficiency of the regulated firms. Huge investments will be needed in the regulated network sectors. The question is brought up if regulatory instruments and institutions primarily designed to improve operating efficiency are equally wellplaced to promote the necessary investments and to balance the resulting conflicting interests between for example consumers and investors.
Keywords: Regulation; Deregulation; Public Interest Theories; Private Interest Theories; Interest Groups; Public Choice; Market Failures; Price-cap Regulation; Rate of Return Regulation; Yardstick Competition; Franchise Bidding; Access Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:1018
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Marina Muilwijk ().