Social Learning in Market Games

Carlo Altavilla (), Luigi Luini () and Patrizia Sbriglia ()

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: The aim of our experiments is to test the effect of different information settings on firms’ behaviour in duopoly price and quantity games. We find that, when players have full information on their rivals’ choices, the imitation rule prevails and such learning behaviour induces more competitive outcomes in the Cournot market designs. By the same token, when information on the average industrial profit is provided, there is evidence of an increase in cooperation, and the majority of players experiment with new strategies when their payoff falls below the average profit (F. Palomino and F. Vega-Redondo, 1999; H. Dixon, 2000)

Keywords: Learning; Cournot and Bertrand experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005-05
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Journal Article: Social learning in market games (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:003

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