Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy

Simona Benedettini () and Antonio Nicita ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: We investigate the deterrent effect on driving behavior due to the introduction of Demerit Point System in Italy. In addition, we measure the incapacitation effect on fatal accidents. Our findings highlight the high potential of the penalty system in reducing road fatalities through deterrence and incapacitation. Despite this, its aggregate effectiveness in Italy ultimately depended on the consistency of the enforcement design. We then suggest several policy options to increase road safety through a credible enforcement.

Keywords: deterrence; incapacitation; law enforcement; road safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pke
Date: 2009-08
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:564

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