Human Capital and Hold-ups in Indigenous Society: The Role of Customs and the Market

Matthew Baker ()

Departmental Working Papers from United States Naval Academy Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the application of some simple models of contracting, bargaining, and human capital acquisition can be employed to understand cross cultural variation in the form and nature of institutions governing land inheritance, marital residence, and the gender division of labor.

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Date: Written
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