How italian electors react to gender quotas? A random utility model of voting behaviour

Bonomi Genny, Brosio Giorgio () and Maria Laura Di Tommaso ()
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Brosio Giorgio: University of Turin, http://www.de.unito.it/web/member/brosio/personal-inf.htm

Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Turin

Abstract: The share of elected positions held by women in democratic countries is still very small. To increase this share many countries bave introduced gender quotas in their electoral rules. In Italy gender quotas, requiring a minimum number of women in electoral lists, bave been introduced for elections at different levels of goverrnnent. This type of quotas does noi ensure in ara open list electoral system that women will get more votes. This effect will depend ora tbc extent to which there is an anti-female bias among voters. To test the presence of an anti-female bias in voting behaviour we set up a random utility model for voting behaviour. The model is then tested ora tbc elections for regional councils in 1995 and 2000. The results show that a higher share of women in party lists leads to a significant increase in the probability that voters will choose a female candidate. This implies that voters are willing to vote more for women (there is noi a perfect gender bias against women). Other important factors influencing voters' behaviour are the length of the party list (the longer the party list, and thus the greater the site of electoral districts, the lower the probability of voting for ara inctimbent candidate) and the position of the party in terms of liberal values. The more tbc party is liberal in terms of these values, tbc higher tbc probability that a woman will be voted.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-upt
Date: 2006-09
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