Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences

Mattias K Polborn ()

No 200012, UWO Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elections. We explore the robustness of the basic model and also find some empirical support for predictions derived from the model.

Date: 2000-12
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/economics/econref/workingpap ... wp2000/wp2000_12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwo:uwowop:200012

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.ssc.uwo.c ... mittingordering.html
The price is Paper copy available by mail at a cost of $10.00 Canadian each.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UWO Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Address: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Series data maintained by ().