Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets

Mattias K Polborn (), Michael Hoy () and Asha Sadanand

No 9911, UWO Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Abstract: Genetic tests can be expected to produce a large amount of economically important information in the future. What are the effects on a life insurance market if more information becomes available over time, for individuals and possibly also for insurers? Should people buy insurance before or after becoming informed? How do earlier trades influence the market equilibrium in later periods? We also analyze the scope for a Pareto improving regulation of the insurance market.

Keywords: insurance; information; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
Date: 1999-10
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Working Paper: Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets (1999)
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