Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

Andrew F Daughety () and Jennifer Reinganum ()

No 508, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

Abstract: We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

Keywords: Multiple litigants; externalities; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 D82 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-law
Date: 2005-04
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http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w08.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0508

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