On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium

Edward John Cartwright () and Myrna Wooders ()

No 512, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

Abstract: Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost Nash property implies a purification result of the standard sort for the original Bayesian game. We also provide an example showing that the bound we obtain on the distance of a purified approximate equilibrium from an exact equilibrium is tight.

Keywords: Ex-post Nash equilibrium; noncooperative games; incomplete information; purification; epsilon ex-post Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-04
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http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w12.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: ON PURIFICATION OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BAYESIAN GAMES AND EX-POST NASH EQUILIBRIUM (2004)
Journal Article: On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0512

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