EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fiscal Discipline before and after EMU - Permanent Weight Loss or Crash Diet?

Andrew Hughes Hallett () and John Lewis

No 516, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of European fiscal policies and the attempts at budgetary consolidation through three periods: the pre-Maastricht phase (to 1991); the run up to monetary union (1992-97), and finally the stability pact phase (1998 onwards). Using three separate indicators Ð the probability of undertaking a consolidation, the degree to which it is sustained, and the probability of exceeding a specified deficit limit Ð we search for structural breaks which could signify a change in the average level of fiscal discipline in these periods. We find increased discipline only up to 1997. Thereafter discipline erodes to the extent that, by 2005, there is less discipline than before the Maastricht process started. We conclude the new fiscal discipline was temporary; a product of the sanction of being denied entry to the Euro, and that EMU itself has had no impact on discipline (in the absence of that sanction). Our methodological innovation is to show the importance of the dynamics of fiscal behaviour: step dummies for changes in the average level of discipline, and trend dummies to capture any decline/increase relative to that average. A single structural break test will miss these dynamic effects, and may generate the erroneous conclusion that fiscal discipline had tightened since the start of phase two of EMU.

Keywords: Fiscal consolidation; probit regressions; dynamic structural breaks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H50 H61 E65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pbe
Date: 2005-05
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w16.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0516

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Diana Weymark ().

 
Page updated 2009-11-24
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0516