Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser () and Nicolás Porteiro ()

No 2006_28, Working Papers from University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the role of the direct mechanisms in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for a version of the Revelation Principle to hold in finite generic games. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.

Keywords: Revelation Principle; Common Agency; Separable Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Common agency games with separable preferences (2003)
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