All-pay Auctions with Budget Constraints and Fair Insurance

Uwe Dulleck (), Paul Frijters () and Konrad Podczeck ()
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Konrad Podczeck: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with budget-constrained bidders who have access to fair insurance before bidding simultaneously over a prize. We characterize a unique equilibrium for the special cases of two bidders and one prize, show existence and a heuristic for finding an equilibrium in the case of multiple bidders and multiple prizes. We end with an example of non-uniqueness of equilibria for the general case of multiple prizes and multiple players.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 D42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ias
Date: 2006-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:0605

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