Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty
Christos Koulovatianos (),
Elena Antoniadou () and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ulrich Schmidt
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric noncooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable resource that reproducesunder uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of resource exploitation. We show that, for this class of games, the tragedy of the commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions. Finally, we provide a specific example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results and, within the specific example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the commons.
JEL-codes: C73 C72 C61 Q20 O13 D90 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-env and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under uncertainty (2013)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:0703
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