Potential games in volatile environments
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
This papers studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a characterization of the set of stochastically stable states is provided, generalizing existing results to models with endogenous interaction structures.
JEL-codes: C73 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Potential games in volatile environments (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1002
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Series data maintained by Paper Administrator ().